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RELEVANCY OF EVIDENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
PROCEEDINGS
Hon. J. W. Deese 1/
INTRODUCTION:
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act provides
"all relevant evidence shall be admitted". While this
eliminates from administrative proceedings some of the more
restrictive rules of evidence, a provision of this nature
stops far short of being an exemption from the rules of
evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines "relevant
evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determi-
nation of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence". Even in states which have
not adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, the general
definition of relevancy is the same. While some states do
not impose upon administrative tribunals the same rules of
evidence used in courts of general jurisdiction, e.g., the
hearsay rule, irrelevant evidence is inadmissible everywhere,
even in tribunals which are said to be exempt from the
"technical rules of evidence". The Judge must first consider
whether the item of evidence tends to prove the fact sought.
to be proved by the evidence.
Also to be considered is materiality. Evidence,
in order to be material, must prove a fact that either is in
issue, or is appropriate for consideration to decide the
issue in the proceeding. Therefore, to be material, a fact
need not necessarily be in dispute. Background information
which aids the Judge in deciding the case, but is not
necessarily disputed, is nevertheless material. Such things
as the address and personal history of a defendant may not
be in dispute, but may be relevant and material, and as such
admissible if these facts would aid the Judge or jury.
However, the Judge must consider whether such information
might be prejudicial, a separate issue.
l/ Reprinted with permission of the author, from materials
presented to the 1986 Annual Meeting of the Association of
the National Judicial College.
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Materiality and sufficiency are not the same.
Evidence may be both relevant and material if it tends to
show a fact in issue or suitable for consideration to decide
a question in issue, even though the item of evidence which
is sought to be admitted is, by itself, not sufficient to
establish that fact. When evidence is offered to prove a
fact which is not germane to the case, the evidence is said
to be immaterial.
In modern jurisprudence, the concepts of relevancy
and materiality have become merged. Today, materiality is
usually regarded as a subcategory of relevancy. Many
attorneys do not always recognize the difference, objecting
as "immaterial", to what is irrelevant and as "irrelevant"
to what is immaterial. There are others whom every Judge
can remember, who object: "Objection! Irrelevant, immate-
rial, and incompetent!". Many Judges take the position that
such an objection is in fact no objection at all because it
fails to clearly state a proper ground for the objection.
However, if the objection is to offer evidence that is
clearly inadmissible, it may very well be that the objection
is proper, even though poorly stated, because of the obvious
inadmissibility of the offered evidence.
Evidence is relevant not only when it tends to
prove or disprove the ultimate fact in issue, but also when
it tends to prove or disprove an evidentiary fact from which
the existence or absence of the ultimate fact in issue can
directly be inferred. Thus, there are two types of evidence:
direct and circumstantial. Testimony by a witness that he
saw a defendant shoot and kill the victim is direct evidence
of homicide. No further inference or presumption is neces-
sary to prove the event to which the witness testified.
However, if the witness testifies that he heard a gunshot,
saw the defendant run from the front door of the house
carrying a revolver, and found the dying victim just inside
the front door, this is circumstantial evidence. It is
offered to first prove a fact, from which the fact in issue
could be inferred or presumed. Circumstantial evidence is
not inadmissible because it is circumstantial. Evidence may
be introduced as circumstantial, from which inferences of
other facts may be drawn by the finder of fact. The party
may offer evidence of evidentiary facts, which would justify
reasonable persons in inferring the existence of the ultimate
fact to be proven.
LEGAL IRRELEVANCY:
Evidence may be excluded that is only of very
remote value when its probative value is significantly
outweighed by either unfair prejudice, confusion of issues,
undue delay, waste of time, or unnecessary proliferation of
the issues. This determination must rest within the sound
discretion of the Judge, who must decide whether the rela-
tively slight probative value is substantially and signifi-
cantly outweighed by the prejudice, confusion, delay, or
waste of time. An example of legal irrelevancy is mathemat-
ical probability. Theories of mathematical probability may
not be used to draw inference of guilt against a criminal
defendant.
SIMILAR HAPPENINGS:
One type of circumstantial evidence that is
usually admissible, except in criminal matters, is evidence
of similar events or transactions. However, such evidence
is not always admissible. If the evidence raises too many
collateral issues, or presents facts that are incapable of
affording any reasonable presumption as to the ultimate
facts in issue, it is inadmissible, under the rule of res
inter alios acta. However, if there is substantial identity
in the circumstances with the evidence offered and the
ultimate facts, and the dangers of unfairness, confusion, or
undue waste of time are not overwhelming, the trial Judge
has the discretion to admit such evidence. Thus, such
evidence is allowed only where the circumstances indicate a
strong probability that the event that occurred in one
instance would also occur in others, including the instance
in question.
CHARACTER EVIDENCE:
The general rule is that character evidence cannot
be used to prove specific conduct. Character evidence
cannot be used to prove guilt of any offense, in either a
civil or criminal proceeding, administrative or otherwise.
This same rule applies in a criminal prosecution, a negli-
gent tort case, a parole revocation proceeding, a misconduct-
type unemployment insurance hearing, or any other type of
civil, criminal or administrative proceeding. There are
several reasons for this general rule. Character evidence
has only remote materiality. It is difficult to ascertain,
because at best it is only the opinion of other persons.
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Admission of character evidence would always lead to prolif-
eration of the issues, making hearings much longer. More
than most evidence, character evidence is readily subject to
fabrication and manufacture. Friends produce favorable
evidence and enemies produce unfavorable evidence. There
are, however, some exceptions to the general rule that
character evidence is not admissible. For example, in some
cases such as libel or slander, character may be an ultimate
fact in issue. In cases of this nature, opinion evidence of
nonmoral traits and reputation is allowed. Evidence of
specific acts is also allowed. The majority of jurisdic-
tions, however, do not allow opinion evidence as to moral
traits. A similar situation exists where reputation, or
knowledge of a person's character, is an ultimate fact in
issue.
In criminal cases, the prosecution, in its case in
chief, may not produce evidence of the character of either
the defendant or the victim. However, a defendant may place
his own character in issue by attempting to prove himself a
person of good character and therefore unlikely to commit
the offense, and may also produce evidence of the character
of the victim. However, evidence of specific acts is not
allowed as character evidence for three reasons: 1. too
time-consuming, 2. confusion due to proliferation of a large
number of collateral issues, and 3. danger of prejudice
would exceed probative value. See Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 405(a) and such states as California, Evidence Code
sections 1102 and 1103. The Federal Rules permit specific
acts to be discussed on cross examination. However, Federal
Rule of Evidence 412 prohibits the use of reputation or
opinion evidence of the past sexual behaviour of the victim
in rape or rape assault cases; unless such evidence is
either constitutionally required to be admitted or is
introduced as evidence of sexual relations with another, to
question whether the accused was the source of semen or
injury, or is offered on the issue of whether the victim had
consented to the sexual act. In this situation, under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, prior motion to use this evidence
must be made and a hearing on its admissibility must be
conducted by the trial Judge.
Once the defendant has placed his character in
issue by putting forth evidence of good character, the
prosecution may cross examine character witnesses about
rumors or reputation of the defendant, and may put on
rebuttal evidence to impeach the defendant's evidence.
However, both cross examination and rebuttal character
evidence are limited to the same character traits asserted
by the defendant's evidence. For example, if the defendant
puts on character evidence of truthfulness and honesty, the
prosecution could not rebut with evidence of drunkenness or
violence.
Prior misconduct by the defendant can be shown by
the prosecution, if produced for reasons other than to show
defendant's character. These purposes may include:
A. To complete the story of the crime. (Res
Gestae)
B. To prove the existence of a common plan,
scheme or design.
C. To prove other similar crimes that are so
unusual and distinctive that they appear to be committed by
the same person. (Modus Operandi)
D. To show passion, lust or propensity for
illicit sexual relations with this same victim.
E. To show motive.
F. To show that the act in question was neither
accidental, unintentional, or without guilty knowledge.
G. To establish identity of the defendant.
H. To prove malice aforethought, deliberation or
that specific intent which is an element of the crime in
question.
I. Acts committed by the defendant which consti-
tute an admission by conduct.
HABIT AND CUSTOM:
Evidence of habit and custom is not classified as
character evidence. A habit is a regular response to a
repeated specific situation. Consequently, evidence of
specific habit is generally admissible to prove conduct,
where it is to be inferred that the actor performed in a
particular way, in a certain situation, because the actor
habitually, always, or usually performs in that specific
situation, in that certain manner. For example, if an
employee, who regularly works five days per week, and has
not missed work in the last three years, is shown to
regularly drive from home to work north on Main Street, this
habit may be shown to infer that the employee drove from
home to work north on Main Street on the day in question.
To constitute a habit, the act must be specific, routine and
continuous. Custom evidence is similarly admissible about
business establishments. The custom evidence is evidence to
establish a course of business conduct, from which it may be
inferred that the business establishment conducted the
transaction in question in the same manner as it usually
conducts such transactions.
SIMILAR.HAPPENINGS:
In accident cases, evidence of other accidents has
been admitted to show existence of a dangerous condition at
the time of the accident, knowledge by the defendant of the
danger, or that the defendant, in the exercise of reasonable
care, should have learned of the dangerous conditions.
Similarly, evidence of the absence of any such similar
accident is also admissible. This can be used to show that
the defendant had no knowledge and should not have reasonably
known of the existence of the dangerous condition. While
the majority of jurisdictions allows such evidence, a
minority rejects such evidence on the basis that such
absence does not tend to prove any fact.
EVIDENCE OF COMPROMISE:
The general rule is that compromise or settlement
negotiations or offers thereof may not be proven as evidence
of liability. However, for other purposes such as the tort
of bad faith by insurer, evidence of compromise may be
relevant and admissible. Because of the nuisance value of
litigation, guilt, negligence, or liability cannot be
inferred from an offer of settlement. Also, as a matter of
public policy, in order to encourage settlements, courts
prohibit the disclosure of settlement attempts. States
split as to whether an actual admission of liability made in
connection with settlement negotiations is admissibl6, but
the majority of jurisdictions will admit the admission of
liability if actually made by a party. (Parties generally
avoid making any such admissions when offering to settle.)
Also, such admission may be used to impeach subsequent
inconsistent statements. Similarly, with criminal matters,
the withdrawal of a plea of guilty by the defendant may not
subsequently be used against him. Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 410 so provides, for the following reasons: 1. a
withdrawn plea is, as a matter of law no plea, thus, it is
also no evidence; 2. the plea may be withdrawn because it
was unfairly obtained. Thus, its use would be similarly
unfair; 3. such evidence is highly prejudicial, and outweighs
its probative value; 4. the defendant may have entered a
plea for reasons other than guilt (North Carolina v. Alford)
or may have bargained the case down to an inconsequentially
small sentence. This is of particular note in parole
revocation where a parolee may, not realizing the parole
revocation implications, plead guilty for a minor sentence,
or time served, rather than remain in custody awaiting
trial, and then move to withdraw that plea upon learning
that the conviction thus obtained establishes a parole
violation and will result in revocation of parole, or
drivers license or business license, etc.
PRIOR JUDGMENTS AND CONVICTIONS:
Generally, a plea of guilty which is not subse-
quently withdrawn constitutes a judicial admission of the
commission of the act in question, and is therefore relevant
and admissible on the issue of liability in a subsequent
civil action against that person for committing the same
act. This judicial admission falls under a recognized
exception to the hearsay rule, and is therefore admissible
even in tribunals which are subject to the hearsay rules.
An exception to this general rule has been recently created
in the United States Supreme Court Case of Alford v. North
Carolina, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162, 1970,
where the Court allowed defendant to enter a plea of guilty
without acknowledging to the Court that he committed the
offense. Where a criminal defendant has entered a guilty
plea under North Carolina v. Alford, known as an Alford
plea, the judgment of conviction may be subsequently used
against the defendant, but the plea itself may not constitute
a judicial admission. The general rule, for non-Alford
pleas, is that while the plea is admissible as a judicial
admission, it is not conclusive in a subsequent civil
action. The defendant may attempt to explain away the plea
to the civil jury.
Judgments of acquittal in a criminal case cannot
be used to show the non-occurrence of the act in a subsequent
civil case, because an acquittal only means that the prose-
cution failed to prove, to the higher standard of proof of
beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of the accused. This
same rule applies to parole revocation proceedings. As in a
civil case, a parole violation must only be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence, or by substantial evidence.
This standard is far less than the beyond reasonable doubt
standard. Consequently, a parolee who is acquitted of a new
crime committed while on parole in an original prosecution
may nevertheless receive revocation of parole for committing
the crime of which he was acquitted. This is true solely
because of the difference in standards of proof required.
Similarly, a parolee who is discharged for misconduct upon
accusation of a criminal act, prosecuted and acquitted in
criminal court for that act, may not use the judgment of
acquittal either for job reinstatement in a personnel or
civil service proceeding, or for eligibility for unemployment
insurance in a UI proceeding. A Merit Systems Protection
Board or Civil Service Commission Administrative Law Judge,
an Unemployment Insurance Administrative Law Judge, or a
Parole Board Administrative Law Judge, is not bound by a
criminal court acquittal and may very well find, in the
administrative law proceeding, that the defendant did commit
the criminal act. On the other hand, a valid judgment of
conviction in parole revocation proceedings is conclusive
because the conditions of parole specifically prohibit
criminal conduct and in most states, specifically prohibit
receiving a new conviction. Again this is true because the
standard of proof in the criminal proceeding is higher,
rather than lower, than the standard in the administrative
proceeding. This is an example of collateral estoppel, the
subject of another portion of this seminar.
Many states do not allow pleas of nolo contendere.
In states that do, a defendant does not plead guilty, but
avoids trial and accepts conviction and punishment, without
acknowledgment of guilt. This is similar, but not the same
as an Alford plea. Federal Rule of Evidence 410, California,
and a number of other states, which allow pleas of nolo
contendere, prohibit the use of a conviction upon plea of
nolo contendere in a subsequent civil proceeding.
SUBSEQUENT REPAIRS OR PRECAUTIONS:
Evidence of subsequent repairs or precautions is
not admissible to prove negligence, regarding a dangerous
condition. This is a rule not of evidence or of credibility,
but rather a rule of public policy. If evidence of repairs
following an accident were admissible against the property
owner, property owners would be extremely reluctant to
repair a dangerous condition before the conclusion of
litigation or settlement. This would frequently result in
additional accidents, which would have been avoidable had
the dangerous conditions been repaired. Because the repair
is made for different reasons--prevention of future accidents--
it does not constitute an admission. This is another
instance 'where the prejudicial nature of the evidence
outweighs its probative value. There are, however, three
purposes for which evidence of subsequent repairs may be
admitted: 1. to impeach inconsistent evidence, 2. to show
that the defendant owned or controlled the property, because
a stranger would not repair or bother someone else's property,
3. to demonstrate cautionary measures, where the defendant
has denied any such feasibility.
RESIDUUM:
There are a number of states which impose upon
administrative tribunals the requirement that the decision
of the administrative tribunal--the agency--must be supported
by a "residuum" of competent evidence. Competent evidence
is defined as evidence which falls within all of the rules
of evidence. In those jurisdictions, Administrative Law
Judges must be aware of all of the rules of evidence, not
just those of relevancy, and must consider whether there is
evidence supporting the decision which would withstand
attack upon the basis of any rule of evidence recognized by
the law of that state. There is considerable question as to
whether this is a rule of evidence or a standard of appellate
review, but in either case, it must be foremost in the minds
of the Administrative Law Judge sitting in such a state.
